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Ill THE SUPREc'lE COUfcT OF TilE 
STl\TE OF' UTAH 
RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
-vs- Case No. 15944 
REX VAtlCE, Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPOlWENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Richard L. A. Phillips, appeals 
from the dismissal of his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah (R. 20). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 26, 1978, appellant petitioned the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (R. 2). Appellant's 
petition was heard in the above-mentioned court on July 6, 
1978, at which time apoellant motioned the court to continue 
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the matter in order for: resnondent to ans\Jer his intc·rrogat0c, 
(R. 12). The lmver court c1eni•cer1 appellcmt's motion for a 
continuance, dismissed his petition and ordered appellant 
returned to California. (R. 12, 20). 
RELIEF SOU(;HT Oil APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lo•.ver court's 
dismissal of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
STATEr~ENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 25, 1978, (;overnor Scott M. Matheson 
received requisition papers from the State of California 
for the extradition of the appellant, Richard L. A. Phillipo. 
Those papers were subsequently transmitted to the Salt Lake 
County Sheric" ~-or execution on f'cav 4, 1978. The ext radi tio~ 
documents charged appellant with murder and attemoted murder. 
On May 26, 1978, appellant petitioned the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, for a writ of habeas corpus (P. 2). On June 27, 
1978, appellant filed a Request for Production of Documents 
seeking, inter alia, all extradition documents received b:• 
Governor Matheson from California, all California police 
reports relating to the events surrounding the underlying 
crime, and any other documents relating to appellant's 
extradition to California currentlv in responr1ent' ~j posscss~o 
(R. 4, 5). 
-2-
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On June 22, 1978, appellant motioned the lower 
court for a Temporary Restraining Order to prohibit ap~ellant 
from being removed to California for a period of 30 days 
(R. 7). The motion was argued before the lower court on 
June 29, 1978, and the court granted appellant's motion up to 
and including July 6, 1978. (R. 8). 
On July 3, 1978, appellant filed interrogatories 
requesting to know what "surveillance techniques were used 
at the time of the alleged offense, either on the petitioner 
or on his associates," what electronic surveillance techniques 
were used and the exact time and place of the crimes (R. lil. 
At the July 6, 1978, hearing appellant motioned the court for 
a continuance "for the reasons that defense counsel is not 
prepared to go ahead vli th the case having been unable to com!Jlete 
discovery." (R. 15). Appellant's counsel argued that he 
should be allowed discovery in order to establish whether 
appellant was or was not under surveillance by California 
authorities at the time of the murder (T. 3, 4). Appellant's 
counsel contended that this information \vould help him show 
that appellant was not in California at the time of the 
commission of the offense (T. 5). 
Respondent argued that it had established a prima 
facie case by introcucing California's extradition documents 
-3-
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and that the burden of proof had then shifted to t_he an~ella,, 
to show that he= was not the Richard L. I\. Phillips cha.r'}ed 
or that he was not in California at the time of the alleged 
commission of the murder. (T. 2,3). Respondent further 
argued that appellant had had over six weeks to arrange for 
witnesses and that even if he procurred witnesses claiming 
I 
appellant was not in California when the murder was committed,l 
I 
it would only create a conflict in the evidence which would 
not defeat extradition (T. 8). 
After hearing arguments for both sides, the court 
denied appellant's motion for a continuance, dismissed his 
petition for habeas corpus relief, and ordered appellant 
returned to California. (T. 8, 9,; R. 8, 17, 18, 20). This 
appeal follows. 
ARGU11ENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY (l) 
DENIED APPELLANT'S HOTION FOR 
A CONTINUANCE AND (2) DISMISSED 
HIS PETITION FOR \•JRIT OF HABE."'.S 
CORPUS ~HEN APPELLANT FAILED TO 
PRODUCE ANY EVIDF.clCE TENDING TO 
SH0\11 THAT HE HAS NOT IN CALIFORNIA 
AT THE TH1E OF THE MURDER FOR h'HICI! 
HE IS BEING EXTRADITED 
California seeks the extradition of annc·J lant on 
charges of murder and attempted murder. Appellant netition~ 
-4-
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the Third Judicial District Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus, contending that he was not in California at the tine 
of the murder and attempted murder (R. 2). On July 3, 1978, 
just three days before the hearing on appellant's petition 
for habeas corpus, appellant filed interrogatories on the 
respondent (R. ll). At the scheduled hearing on July 6, 1978, 
appellant's motion for a continuance, reauested in order to 
allow respondent sufficient time to respond to the inter~ 
roqatories, was denied and his petition was dismissed (R. 12). 
Appellant now argues that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by refusing to grant his request for a 
continuance in order to allow him to engage in discovery. 
Respondent asserts that the trial court properly 
denied appellant's motion for a continuance, and properly 
dismissed appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
for the following reasons: 
A. 
THE CONTROL OF DISCOVERY IS ENTRUSTED 
TO THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETIO~l IN THIS W\.TTER. 
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
il953), appellant filed his interrogatories on respondent. 
Rule 33(a) allows a party to serve. without leave of court, 
interrogatories on another party which must be answered 
-5-
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within t~irty days. The rulco allm .. ·s t:H' court to sho;- Len or 
lengthen the time for response and mi1ke'' :u>plicable t''c notioc 
to compel! discovery under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1953), \·There the party served objects or fails to aw;•,.7er. 
Rule 37(a) provides an order to compel! discovery 
where the party served under Rule 33 fails to respond, but 
the granting of this motion rests completely within the sou~ 
discretion of the trial court. 
Thus, under the Utah Statutory law, ultimate contra: 
of discovery rests with the trial court. GM Leasing v. Muru 
First Thrift and Loan, 534 P. 2d 1244 (Utah, 1975). This 
principle is con~tstcnt with the practice in other states. 
Banta v. Suoerior Court, 212 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653 (197G); 
State ex rel. Babbit v. Arnold, 26 Ariz. Aop. 333, 543 P.2d 
426 (1976); Commercial Union Insurance v. \vichita, 217 Kan. 
44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975); Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. Chez, 
527 P.2d 165 (Okla., 1974). The courts have adopted this rul,. 
by concluding that "without reasonable judicial control, the 
instruments of discovery arc susceotible to abuse and ~av be 
utilized for purpose of delay, annoyance and harrassment." 
Jones v. Bank of Nevada, 525 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1975). 
Because control of discovery lies within the 
discretion of the trial court, a rcvicc•.vin<J court- 11ill ovccrtu' 
a decision regarding discovery onlv where it c~n be s~own 
-(;-
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that a trial court has abused its discretion. Johnson v. 
American Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 199, 531 P.2d 
932 (1975). In Bartholome\1 v. Bartholome<.-r, 538 P.2d 239, 240 
(Utah, 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated that it would not 
overrule a lower court's determination as to discovery in the 
"absence of any action in that regard which is so unreasonable 
as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear 
abuse of his discretion." The Utah Supreme Court did not 
find an abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action 
where a trial court did not dismiss an action with prejudice 
where the parties had previously agreed to dismissal with 
prejudice if discovery was not completed by a specific date 
(GI1 Lectsing v. Hurray First Thrift and Loan, supra) and where 
a party was granted summary judgment because the other party 
failed to produce his records as required by the trial court's 
order. Tucker Realty, Inc., v. Nunley. 16 Utat 2d 97, 396 
P. 2d 410 (1964). 
Thus, respondent submits that a trial court's 
discretion is very broad in matters of discovery and its 
decisions relating to discovery will not be overturned without 
a showing of a clear abuse or obvious capriciousness. In the 
instant case, appellant does not contend that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance 
-7-
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in order to allow for discovery, but even if he h~d, the 
grounds for his complaints would not amount to an abuse of 
discretion. 
Appellant argues that discovery would have allow~ 
him to prove he was not in California when the crimes were 
corrunitted without \•Jaiving his privilege against s~lf-in-
crimination and by more credible evidence than his own 
self-serving testimony. The trial court responded to these 
contentions at the July 6, 1978, hearing by observing that 
appellant should know where he was on the date the murder was 
corrunitted and should have been able to produce witnesses to 
establish th'lt he \VCIS not in California at the t:irce. (R. 31, 
32). It is o'T.-~ ::ns thr1t apnellant would not need to engage i 
discovery to show his non-presence in California at the ti~ 
of the murder if, in fact, he was not there. If he was not b 
California at that time he could have produced witnesses to 
that effect, the result of which would have been that he woul' 
not have to waive his privilege against self-incrimination 
by offering his own self-serving testimony. Thus, hacl ap-
pellant contended that the action of the tr~al court was an 
abuse of discretion, it is clear from these facts that no abL' 
existed and that the court's action in denying discovery was 
proper. 
" 
" 
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r.npE'llCJr.t relies heavily on Jlarris v. nelsor:_, 394 
U.S. 28fi, reh. den. 394 U.S. ln:>s (1969), for the urouosition 
that "la\·1 and justice" might require the allm·:ance of discovery 
in appropriate circumstances. Respondent does not challenge 
this conclusion, but again asserts that the "appropriate 
circumstances" for discovery did not exist in the instant 
matter. 
In Harris v. Nelson, sunra, Alfred Halker had heen 
convicted in a California state court of the crime of 
possession of marijuana. After exhausting st2te remedies, 
he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District 
Court and motioned the court for an evidentiary hearing, which 
the court granted. Two months later, Walker served upon the 
respondent warden a series of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 
33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent filed 
objections to the interrogatories, alleging they were not proper 
in a habeas corpus proceeding. The District Judge (Harris) 
disallowed the objections and directed that the interrogatories 
be answered. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
order of theDistrict Court, holding that the discovery pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not 
applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. 
-9-
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Ninth C'ircuit "that Sule 33 of thf' Fc•dcral Rulr's of' civil 
Procedure is not apnlicable to habeas cornus nroc~cding3." 
394 u.s. at 290. HOI·Tevc'r, the Supreme Ccurt did conclu:k 
that in anpropriate circumstances, where a district court WJ~ 
confronted ''i th a petition for hubeas corpus \Ihich establ is:,~, 
a prima facie case for relief, the district court could 
authorize suitable discovery procedures in accordance with 
23 u.s.c. § 2246. 
Resnondent first notes that Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule pursuant to \•lhich anpellil~t I 
filed interro~at~~i~~ or the respondent, is exactly pattern~ 
after Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Th~ 
Harris Court stated unequivically that Rule 33 is not 
applicable in habeas corpus proceedings. It busec1 this con-
elusion on two~rounds. 
First, the Court found that Rule 33 does not 
properly fit the special character of habeas corpus proceedi~ 
"Indeed, it is difficult to 
believe that the drafts8en of the 
Rules or Congress would have anolied 
the ciscov<ery rules Hithout rno<lificCJ.tion 
to habeas corpus procee~inqs hcc~us0 
their specific nrovisinns ~re ill-suite~ 
to the soccial problems and charac~er 
of such nrocacdings. For cxa~ola, 
Rule 33, which Walker here invot0l, 
nrovidcs for writter1 interrn~r~Lnrirs 
-]1'--
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to be served by any party upon any 
'adverse party. • As the present 
case illustrates, this would usually 
mean that the prisoner's interrogatories 
must be directed to the warden although 
the warden would be unable to answer 
from personal knowledge questions 
relating to petitioner's arrest and 
trial. Presumably the warden could 
solicit answers from the anorooriate 
officials and reply 'under-oath,' as 
the rule reauires; but the ward2n is 
clearly not-the kind of 'adversarv 
party'-contemplated by the discov~ry 
rules, and the result of their 
literal application would be to in-
voke a procedure which is circuitous, 
burdensome, and time consuming." 
394 U.S. at 296 
Second, because of the liberal construction of 
Rule 33, generally provided for by the courts an~ because 
Rule 33 allows the filing of interrogatories without leave of 
court, the Harris Court felt that the blanket availability 
of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings would only serve to 
delay the proceedings and do violence to the puroose of 
habeas corpus. 
"Except for interrogatories to 
be serve~ bv the 'plaintiff' within 
10 c1avs aft,;,r the cOcU'1ence:nent of 
'the action,' Rule 33 provides that 
the interrogatories may be served 
without leave of court. The 'adverse 
party' must then take the initiative 
to contPst the interrogatories and 
a heat· ins in court on his objections 
is require~. Unavoidably, unless 
thoro i.s Cl neusure of responsibility 
-11-
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in the oric;inator of the nroc~cclin<J, 
the 'nlaintiff' or p~titioner, this 
nroce~ure can be exceedingly burJen-
~ome and vexatious. T!1e interrogato!-v 
procedure would be available to the 
prisoners thenselves since most 
habeas petitions are prepared and 
filed by orisoners, generally without 
the guidance or restraint of nembers 
of the bar. For this reason, too, w~ 
conclude that the literal application 
of Rule 33 to habeas corous proceedinss 
would do violence to the efficient 
and effective administration of the 
Great l·lrit. The burJen uoon courts, 
ori~on officials, prosecutors, and 
police, which is necessarily and 
prooerly incident to the processing 
an] acjudication of habeas corpus 
nro:::ee,1i,..,c;s, t•rould be vastly in-
cre2sej: and the bene~it to prisoners 
~c ~~ counterbalanced ty the 
'=l~y chich the elaborate discovery 
procedrres would necessarily entail." 
394 U.S. at 297. 
For these reasons, the Harris Court conC' luded that 
the discovery provisions of Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure woulJ not be applicable in habeas corpus 
proceedings. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
being patterned after R•cle :03 of thE' Federal Ru]c·s, the salle 
reasor.s and conclus-ions a'J"'lV in the instan+: c2.:~c·. ~-\esoo:den~-· 
Sheriff Vance, is ill-equi ppEoc1 to a.r.sHer the crue~o t LOns oro-
oounded in aopellant's interro0atorics as they dr·.•l with a 
murder and attemr>tecl murder co:nr1i ttcc1 in Citlifon• i 1. Like-
wise, such a broac1ranging prelininary innu1rv ic; 11cither 
-1 7-· 
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necess~ry or ar0ron1~iate in th~ context of a hateas corpus 
proceeding in connection with an extradition. For these 
reasons, respondent asserts that Rule 33 o~ the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure should not be applied in habeas cor~·s 
proc~edings brought to defeat extradition. 
~~ile the Harris Court held Rule 33 inapplicable 
to habeas corpus proceedings, it did note that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2246 might allow discovery in habeas cor~us Ratters in 
very limited circumstances. Section 2246 allows disposition, 
in the discretion of the judge, on application for habeas 
corpus. Respondent notes t:1at Rule 65B (i) of the Ute>.h Rules 
of Civil Procedure contains no comparable provision which 
._.rould allow for even liwited discovery in habeas corpus pro-
cef'd inrJs. Thus, respondent ass<"rts that, under Utah law, the 
filing of interrogatories is improper in a habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
!1. 
APPELLANT FAILED TO FILE HIS 
INTERROGATORIES IN A TIMELY 
!1_1\."'UES.. 
Appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas 
cornus on May 26, 1978 (R. 2), but did not file his in-
terroqDtorics until ,!uly 3, 1978, (R. 1 1 ), just three days 
before thr; scheduled hearing on his petition. 
-] ,_ 
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Courts have lonr:J hc:ld th,lt intc;rroqo !-.~r i.l'S s~r',7ec1 
long after thE> commencement of un action ancl il short tine 
before the case is set for trial come too lut0. 
Proc., 3rd Ed., p. !176. Indeed, in Theis v. Chicaqo and 
N. 1·7.R. Co., 107 Imva 522, 78 N.\'7. 199 (1899), the Sunre;-'11, 
Court of Iowa found that w~ere a olaintiff had begun an acti~ 
in November of 1895 which was set for trial on ~ugust 29, 
1896, and had not filed intc;rrogatories until Z\ugust 13, l39f, 
the interrogatories were not tinely filed. The Iowa court 
concluded that the Plaintiff could hAve filed his interro'J~tou 
substantially earlier and that by waiting as he did would 
create substantial delays. 
In Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. 
Ap!J. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567 (1959), the plaintiff filed suit or. 
November 2, 1956. On November 26, 1957, trial was set for 
February 24, 1958. Plaintiff filed his interrogatories on 
February 5, 1958, to which responr1ent promntlv ohjectcc1. T''e 
California District Court of Anneals found that nlaintiff's 
interrogatories had not bee~ Filed in a ti~ely manner an~ 
allowed respondent's objections to them. 
The above-quoted cases clearly illustrate the 
requirement that interrogiltories be filed in a tim~lv Eash0 
This is especially critical in a haccC~s cornu'; nrn-::,cJinc; 
--J ti--
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bnc~use oE the exneJited n~ture of the proceedin~. Purthermore, 
uherC' the habeas cor;>u•; proceeding <~as ini tia te·1 to challenge 
extradition, also on expedited proceeding, there is even 
further need to act quickly and file interrogatories in a 
timely fashion. 
Respondent asserts that the trial court properly 
denied appellant's request for a continuance, in order to 
allow resoondent ti~e to answer his interrogatories, because 
said interrogatories were not filed until three days before 
the scheduled he~ring on appellant's netition for habeas 
corpus. 
c. 
HAD THE TRIAL COURT GR.I\'ri'ED 
APPELLl\NT' S T10'I'IOC' FOR A COll-
TI~UANCE IN ORDER TO ALLOW 
RESPONDENT SUFPICIENT TIME TO 
Cl.ESPo;m TO .Z\PPELLA"lT' s IN-
TERROGATORIES, THE INPO~~I\TION 
PROCURRED THROUGH DISCOVE"n 
\•IOULD 'lOT HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE TO 
HELP APPELLl'.NT CARRY HIS BURDEN 
OF' PROOF. 
At the hearing on apnellant's petition for habeas 
con ·us. etnoellant co!"'tenc1ed t"lat he ':las not in the deT:landing 
state (CaliFornia) at the time the offense which he had been 
accused of cOICLmitting 1·;as perr:>etrated (T. 3). .'\,-,pellant 
ar~uec1 that the inform3tion he sought by way of discovery 
1•1"1]·1 .~]l_o,·· him to sho'T that he Has not in C2.lifornia at the 
-1')-
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R.es~Ondr;nt C1SS~rts t-_ha_t_ haa the:> tr.i:Il ~~ot::r:-t Srrlnt::rl 
ao?ellant the C!isco'.'f'ry he sought, the in"on'l=ttion crained 
thereby \VOt!ld not have established that he '''CIS n•1t in 
California at the tiP.l.e the crimes Here comr1ittcocl. Therefore, 
appellant would not have carried his burden of rroaf and the 
trial court would have been com:Jelled to dismis'; his petitior. 
One way a request for extradition may be defeat~ 
by the person demanded is to estctblish th0t he \,.,·,s not in the 
demanding state at the time the crime with which ~P is charg~ 
with committing was perpetrated. State ex rel. G~ines v. 
lvestheus, 318 tlo. 928, 2 S.\·?. 2d 612 (1928). HOV/C'Ver, the 
denanded oersorc ··c;st n::-ove this fact beyond a rc~t~:onabJe dr>cbl 
People ex rel. .>:.-~ .. ' v. ElroC::, 3L!L! N.E. 2d 71~ (111., 1976). 
If his evidence is r1erely contradictory, it \vill not overcome 
the prima facie case established by the Governor'~ warrant. 
Smith v. State, 373 F.2d H'l (9th Cir., 1%7). l ndeed, in 
South Carolina v. Bailev, 2'39 U.S. 412 (1933), t!>C' United 
States Supreme Court stated that a court \vould no~ discharge: 
"a de::enc:ant 2rrested und'C'r [a] 
governor's \·'arrant '.'l~ere t~r::re i.s 
merely contradictory evidence on the 
subject of nres~nce in or absence 
fran the st~te, as habeas carnus is 
not tho nroner procecrting to try the 
question of alibi, o>:- anv crucstion 
as to thP guilt or innocence of the 
accusrecl." 289 U.S. at ~21. 
- 1 (. .... 
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release at thQ trial level, he woulrt h~v2 hart to estahlish 
hcvond a reasonable doubt t~at he was not in CaliFornia 
when the cr imcs 1vere com.--n.i t ted. J'.ppellant pronoscd to n::-ove 
this bv discoverino 11hether California nolice h'l0 him unJer 
surveillance at the time of the cooonission of the murder 
and attempted ~urder. Appellant anparently believed that he 
was under surveillance by California police elsewhere when the 
crimes were committed and that police repo~ts ~ight establish 
that fact. 
Assuming, arguendo, that discovery had been allo~ed 
and that the oolice reports showed appellant to have been under 
surveillance at a location away froD the scene of the murder 
and attempted murder, that fact would not establish that 
anrellant was r.ot in California 1vhen the crimes were corru-,litted, 
but rather thilt he I'JS in California at the time. The fact 
that he was under surveillanc0 aHay froH the scene of the 
crimes is not relevant to t~e extradition proceeding, but 
'.7oulc1 he raised os an Cl.li_bi 2.t his trial in California. 
South Carolina v. nailev, suora. 
Assuming, arquendn, that discovery had been allowed 
an~ that the nolicc renorts showed that appellant was not 
unclpr nol icE' surv0j ]_ l2nce at the til'le of the com.rnission of the 
cL·ir1cs, this fact l·iotlld not e~t?J·lish bcvond a reasonable doubt 
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cor.1mission of t:r.e cri~1es charqerl. 
prove that appellant was not und~r police surveillance at 
the time. 
For appellant to prev~il on his clai~ t~at he 
was not in California vlhen t'le cri:r10s were corrw.ittecl, h<e m•J'~ 
show by credible evidence thRt he was outside the state. 
In either case hypothesized above the evidenc~ would not 
be sufficient to establish th::!t necessarv fact. Thus, had 
discovery been allowed, the in~ornatio~ sought by tho 
appellant would not have teen adequate to sustain his burden 
of proor arc' r,::-cr·•·c·' his release. Therefor,.., the triill court 
properly denied apPellant's motion for a continuance in 
order to obtain discovery. 
CONCLUSIO'~ 
Respondent asserts that the trial court properly 
denied appellant's request for a continuance in order to 
facilitate his request for discn~erv because (l) Pule 33 o• 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not anolica~le to 
habeas corpus procec>dinCJS and (2) aopellilnt' s interroqatories 
were untimely filed. 
-n-
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Respondent further etsserts thQt the tcial court 
properly dismissed appellQnt's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus because appellant failed to show that he was not in 
California at the time the charged crirtes 1t1ere comrr.itted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. H?.~7SE!-i 
Attornev General 
EARL F. D!)~IUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
~ttcrneys for Respondent 
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